Code with Zero Vulnerabilities, Yet $15.5 Million Still Siphoned Off via On-Chain Self-Custody

Code with Zero Vulnerabilities, Yet $15.5 Million Still Siphoned Off via On-Chain Self-Custody

2026-11-17 18:36

Introduction: CEX hackers then move to DEX, even zero-code-vulnerability protocols are drained. Approximately $15.5 million in USDC was siphoned from two market maker accounts on Lighter, a decentralized perpetual exchange.

CEX hacked, then DEX hacked—zero-code vulnerabilities still leave vaults empty.

At 02:11 UTC on November 16, the decentralized perpetual futures exchange Lighter urgently paused all withdrawals and liquidity pool creation across its platform after hackers drained approximately $15.5 million in USDC from two market maker accounts without exploiting a single line of smart contract code, doing so within minutes.

Zero-code vulnerability, yet vaults still emptied.

Just half a month earlier, on October 30, Binance—the world’s largest centralized exchange—experienced a major industry-shaking incident where hot wallets were drained of digital assets worth roughly $6.34 billion. In just eighteen days, both a centralized giant and a decentralized newcomer fell victim to breaches.

Zero-fee liquidity pools became hackers’ backdoor withdrawal channels

At 10:11 UTC on November 16, blockchain monitoring firm Bitquery detected anomalous activity from two large market maker accounts with IDs 714710 and 714723. The platform's native token, LIT, subsequently plummeted over 17% within 24 hours.

Under Lighter’s original permission model, API keys could only be used for trading and internal transfers between associated wallet addresses. Withdrawals to external addresses required signing by the wallet’s primary private key. However, attackers first liquidated all positions in the compromised accounts and consolidated the proceeds into USDC. They then created a zero-fee public liquidity pool using the breached account, injected approximately $10,000 from their own wallet into this new pool, captured 99.99% of the share, and proceeded to flood the pool with funds at $1 million per transaction via the market maker accounts. Finally, they redeemed their shares directly—circumventing withdrawal signature verification—and withdrew $10.39 million in USDC to Ethereum mainnet.

Hackers repurposed compliant business functionality into a blood-sucking channel.

This capital was converted into 5,764 ETH via CoW Swap within four minutes. Of this, 1,600 ETH were dispersed across ten newly created wallets and routed to another decentralized exchange, Hyperliquid, to purchase privacy coin XMR. The remaining 4,165 ETH stayed on mainnet addresses. The other account’s planned $5.09 million USDC transfer was intercepted in time due to the platform’s Guardian security mechanism. Later that day, the security committee recovered approximately $5 million and restored withdrawal functionality.

Post-incident analysis pointed to a fundamental engineering oversight: the third-party signing code used by market makers reused cryptographic nonces, allowing attackers to reverse-engineer the API private key directly from publicly visible transaction signatures.

A fake job offer opened the door to Binance’s internal signing infrastructure

Attackers linked to the North Korean hacking group TraderTraitor impersonated recruiters and lured a core Binance wallet engineer into downloading malware during a fake interview.

Once the malicious software infiltrated the engineer’s development environment, it replaced the local Python virtual environment tool pyenv, enabling lateral movement and gaining access to internal AI tools and the wallet infrastructure team. This led to full takeover of the internal signing service. According to Binance’s preliminary investigation report released on November 3, on October 30, hackers launched coordinated attacks across multiple blockchains, transferring 18,270 BTC, 970,500 SOL, and 44.2 million OP from Binance’s hot wallets. On Ethereum, they abused the EIP-7702 account abstraction authorization mechanism to submit 50 signed transactions, delegating partial hot wallet execution rights to external malicious smart contracts. Due to the multi-party secure computation architecture of affected hot wallets, Binance’s team lacked a single private key to revoke on-chain delegations instantly. Simply shutting down server-side withdrawal interfaces couldn’t stop already-executed contract authorizations. Ultimately, coordination with issuers and partners enabled freezing and interception of approximately $2.85 billion in assets, while Binance self-funded restoration of affected token reserves to above 98% before October 31.

After assets are on-chain, granularity of permissions is life-or-death

The industry has long held the belief that as long as assets are moved from centralized exchanges into decentralized protocols, custodial risk is completely eliminated.

Yet, the core defense of centralized exchanges lies in employee endpoints and cold-hot wallet isolation. If a single core engineer’s laptop is compromised via phishing, even with multi-party secure computation signing, attackers can leverage novel features of on-chain account abstraction to bypass traditional risk controls.

On-chain self-custody also has its Achilles’ heel.

While decentralized exchanges lock asset settlements into smart contracts, they sacrifice security for high-frequency trading experience by entrusting account fund management to off-chain API keys. Once market makers opt for convenience and use un-audited third-party signing scripts—or if protocols fail to include public liquidity pool transfers in high-risk withdrawal whitelists—hackers can directly drain accounts. Lighter’s emergency patch post-incident exposed the root cause: the platform now mandates that all transfers to public liquidity pools must be signed by the primary wallet, and implements IP whitelisting for API keys along with fine-grained permission isolation.

For institutions and traders holding large sums on-chain or on exchanges, passing a code audit is merely the starting point of security. What truly determines ownership of principal is whether signing devices are physically isolated and whether API permissions are strictly confined to pure trading functions.

Source: TechFlow Column

#Industry Research Report

Disclaimer: Contains third-party opinions, does not constitute financial advice

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